[illegible]

[illegible]; A [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

by [illegible]

[illegible] This study had two purposes, the first of which [illegible] an analysis and interpretation of the writers of Jerusalem, a Turkish administrative and economic town of northern Iraq. In carrying out this purpose, it is necessary to make reference to other cultural territories in Iraq and the Middle East. On the other hand, inasmuch as primitive, localized communities of the Kurds have not been positively integrated, this study of Jerusalem is also to contribute to the knowledge of the Middle East. The Kurds are a Semitic people [illegible] nomadic villagers, who inhabit the mountainous regions where the frontiers of Iraq, Iran, Russia, Syria, and Turkey meet. The second purpose of this study is the delineation of the impact of the society upon the structure of the society of the town and the direction which it takes. The secondary but important [illegible] "social" interactions [illegible] to the extent of 50%.

An analysis and interpretation of the writers of Jerusalem are presented in nine areas of interaction: [illegible] the administrative center, [illegible] the economic center, [illegible] towns, tribes, and clans, [illegible] the society, [illegible] the family, [illegible] neighbor life. The exploration of the two cultural areas [illegible] and its technical basis by [illegible] of landmarks,

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (1)

[illegible]

characteristic of it was the intense development. The Serbian branch of Orthodoxy has now evidently discovered that it will be a witness, and the Serbian obstinate to be witness its former monastic or patriarchal power. A new vision, that of orthodoxy and witness, has been introduced with an unheralded sphere of ministry, and the result has not been without conflict. The fact that the practice has been linked with European ecclesiastical values in the more interesting. The second object of this study is the delineation of this conflict, and a consideration of the alternatives to Serbian life which Princess chose. The recognition that orthodoxy, commonly mentioned in the Middle East as a European ideology to one shares, may be pointed to more intimate which commands real mental sphere of a different order for a number of great importance to the analysis of the area.

The Serbian population of Iraq has been estimated at about 100,000, although figures vary considerably, and comprises the ecclesiastical world of Basra, northwest of Amara, and much of Kirkuk. In many Christian Arab villages here settled not as the first exposure of Syrian Europeanism, a small portion of this population to consider, observing their friends in the town pitches area, and seeking the patronage of the schools in the cities. Serbian Iraq provides a stabilizing environment for the well-heeled Arabs and Kurdish of the central and southern provinces. The terrain is rugged, with peaks reaching 8000 feet above sea level, and is characterized by precipitous heights, deep gorges,

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The lore of Sumeria, as has been noted, has a population of over 5,000 persons, the overtones of which shall be dealt with later. A lore of this size qualifies as a sociological [illegible], including the [illegible] of Sumerian society, its existence in its own milieu, that of [illegible], a position similar to that of an American negro, save that it is oppositive rather than alienative. Normally the [illegible] in Grey has a headquarters, comparable to the American ship [illegible], and a chief of the sea, including a lieutenant and other officials. In Sumeria, however, there has not been any particular need for the institution of such a separate body, and "seringitches" administrative negotiations are sent through [illegible] or diplomat facilities.

The problems presented by lore sociolinguistics appear to be very slight. Points which be encountered by the [illegible] and other historians of the child rate (See of the newspapers have reference to "Hatted (HAT) as well as legal grievances are handled directly by the judge. In comparison with the outlying districts, the lores be extraordinarily law-abiding, which does a certain amount of [illegible] pilfering. Sporadic seamy events are quite frequent, the most such often a fight between rival children. Such skirmishes begin with words ("Grandchild" be a favorite), and beginning to hair-pulling or an exchange of blows with [illegible] be evident which a barefoot strategy be beaten, kicked or [illegible]. The religious sanctity [illegible], and morals, of what, does exist a thing negative attributed otherwise. Fighting between men be infrequent, but can become

THE KURDS OF IRAQ

C. J. Edmonds

I

KURDISTAN is the country inhabited by the Kurds or a homogeneous community. It is divided between Turkey, Persia and Iraq with small overlaps into Syria and the Soviet Union, and its boundaries do not coincide with any international frontiers or internal administrative divisions.

Iraqi Kurdistan is bounded on the north and east by the Turkish and Persian frontiers, where the population on both sides is almost entirely Kurdish. On the south-west the internal administrative boundary has approximately along the railway from the Syrian frontier to Mosul city on the Tigris and thence a straight line to Mandali on the Persian frontier. The majority of the Kurds are thus encompassed in the four Liwas (Provinces) of Dohuk, Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymani. Dohuk Liwa contains the whole of Dohuk (100% of the rural population), Arbil (91%), Kirkuk (10%) and Sulaymani (100%). Kurds also have a majority in the two Liwas of Mosul and Kirkuk. Other than the Kurds, there are villages of Christian Christians near Mosul city to the north and west, and about 10,000 partisans mainly settled in the highlands of the Amadiya region; there are also colonies of Turkomans in a string of towns, large and small, along the great highway leading from Mosul through Arbil, Altun Kupri, Kirkuk and Kifri towards Baghdad. On the other hand there are islands of Kurds outside these limits, the most interesting being the Jaaf tribes, west of Mosul, whose men of the Jaaf [illegible] are Yezidis, the people often misleadingly described as devil worshippers.

The Kurdish population of Iraq can be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy on the basis of the census of 1947, as about 1,000,000 or nearly one fifth of the total for the whole country. The statistics are available for Persian Kurdistan but a similar figure would be a supportable guess. The Turkish census of 1940 gives the number of persons whose mother tongue was Kurdish as one and a half millions; there is reason to think that the real number of Kurds is higher, perhaps two millions. The religion of the great majority of the Kurds is all three countries is Sunni Muslim; the mystical dervish orders have adherents in all parts of Kurdistan.

Of the larger towns Sulaymani is entirely and Arbil predominantly Kurdish. Another township in which Kurds form the whole or the large

[illegible]

the nomads in the South Kurdish area. Their traditions place their origins in the Zibaree area of Persian Kurdistan, where in fact some 10—12 Jaf tribes still live. About 210 years ago, the tensions between the Shi'i Persian government and the Sunni Jaf precipitated conflict, and the tribes which refused subjection were unable to defend themselves, and fled across the border to the Sunni Ottoman Empire. This group of migrants is said to have consisted some 100 families. They were given pastures close to the Persian frontier, which they in turn served as protectors. As a result of natural growth, and by assimilation of small outlandish tribes into their organization, the group grew to the present total of some 40,000 persons. Up till 11—40 years ago, they had exercised nomadism. At the present time the nomadic sections make up only a small fraction of the total, numbering some 1—1000 individuals.

The annual migration of the nomadic Jaf carries them ca. 210 km. from their winter camps on the *Jiyan* to the summer pastures in the high mountains. Unlike the otherwise similar Caucasian Kurdish nomads, the Jaf have no permanent homes for winter use, but live in their black tents all year. Agricultural pursuits are rare, and practically only consist in being a man to raise a crop of grain, or owning the soil to the farmers. More typically, the economy is purely pastoral.

ASSIMILATION. There is some vagueness as to the Kurdish classification of the Jaf unit. If one asks a settled Jaf to what tribe, clan, or lineage, he will tend to answer Jaf. On the other hand, Jaf informants outlining the political structure were unwilling to see the term Jaf for the whole group, and preferred to reserve it for the more smaller units: the various sections making up the Jaf group (usually the Arabic term *fakhiz*) was preferred, having reference both to a people and to an area (cf. Leach, op.cit., p. 111). Obviously, this is a slight misapplication, considering that the nomadic Jaf share their area with a number of other groups. Due to the above mentioned historical process of growth by assimilation, the Jaf today constitute a federation of groups of diverse origin. They themselves make the distinction between certain Jaf and later assimilated groups, but have no special term or organization for the former Jaf.

For lack of a better term, the Jaf confederacy as a whole should

claim the right of wintering in the Christian villages of Armenia, and, as fanatical Moslems, they indulged on occasion in massacres of their unwilling Christian hosts—this often with the connivance or tacit approval of the Turks, who were not reluctant to see the Christian communities of Asia Minor decrease in numbers.

For obvious reasons, detailed figures as to the number of the Kurds are not available,[1] but estimates, some of them much out of date, give a total of some 3 millions, distributed as follows:

Turkey	1,250,000
Iraq (1962)	650,000
Iran	700,000
Baluchistan	150,000
Transcaucasian Russia (1926)	115,000
Syria	100,000
Afghanistan	80,000

The Kurds cannot be said to have any advanced political feeling, and, even less than the Bedouin Arabs, have rarely been able to combine for long in a stable, large-scale political organization. Individualism and local tribal feeling are the chief characteristics. Kurdish political activity has been negative: that is, strongly against any other group that has tried to rule them, and their proliferation tends to be anti-governmental, whatever the composition of the latter may be, rather than for pro-Kurdish aims. Since 1925 there have been ten serious revolts by the Kurds against various national governments—two against Turkey, four in Iran, and four in Iraq. One of these, in 1927, made use of weapons looted from Iranian military depots. Such revolts lend themselves to intervention by outside powers; and an American view[2] is that a Kurdish revolt against Iran in 1945 had Soviet support from Russia, with the aim of embarrassing the Iranian government. Little was finally achieved, however: one factor may have been the importance to the time of American lend-lend supplies to Russia, as the result of which the U.S. was able to exert some moderating influence on Russian policy.

Since 1927, a Kurdish independence movement, the "Khoibun", has been in existence, but its activities have hitherto had little success, the main obstacle being jealousy, division, and lack of co-operation among the Kurds themselves. An attempt was made to enlist

[1] In modern Turkish statistics the Kurds are described as "Mountain Turks".
[2] That of Professor W. L. Westermann.

The Future [illegible] (Jan–June) 1953 RI Soviet Union RI
Caucasia Div.
Translations Ref. Asia

was 'translated' and in the end the Russian alphabet was re-introduced.

Many 'Soviet Assyrians' disliked the anti-religious policy of the Bolsheviks, the continuous experiments which the Soviet authorities made with Assyrian cultural life, as well as the entire communist social system. A large number of Assyrians therefore left Russia for Iraq in the period between the wars to join the Assyrian levies under British command.

During and after the Second World War Soviet Russian power politics made use of the Assyrians of Northern Persia. Although their number was small Soviet occupation authorities mobilized them, together with local Armenians, in support of the pro-Russian autonomous régime established in Tabriz. After the withdrawal of the Red Army troops the Persian Assyrians suffered together with all other groups of the population in whom the Russians had shown particular interest.

RUSSIA AND THE KURDISH PROBLEM

The small number of Assyrians in Middle Eastern countries (30,000 in Iraq, 5,000 in Syria, 25,000 in Persia) indicates that Russia could use them only for very limited purposes. The Kurds may become a more redoubtable instrument in Russian hands. They are one of the most important factors in the Middle East. How many Kurds are there altogether? This purely statistical question is in itself part of the 'Kurdish problem'. In Turkey, for instance, official data referring to 1945 say that their number in that country does not exceed 1,300,000, but sources more favourable to the Kurdish national point of view speak of 4,300,000 Turkish Kurds. It is significant that this latter figure is approvingly quoted in a Russian monograph on Turkey.[9] In addition, there are 600,000 Kurds in Iraq, 700,000 in Persia and 200,000 in Syria.

The four States with a Kurdish population are bound to draw closer to each other for military, geographical, political and economic reasons. The Kurdish question common to all of them to a greater or lesser degree may prove to cement their unity. Russia's interests are the exact opposite of those of the four Middle Eastern countries with Kurdish minorities. Russia is a bitter opponent of any kind of federation on her borders. What she wants is not Kurdish cement but Kurdish dynamite.

For a long time Soviet Russia had had no real Kurdish policy. The strength of Britain in the Middle East prevented both the Soviet Government and the Communists from playing the Kurdish card. In Russian communist eyes the Kurds were but a 'counter-revolutionary force', a tool of British imperialism intended to embarrass Turkey, the Arab world and even the Soviet Union itself.

But even at the time when leading Soviet quarters still held this negative view on the Kurds, they envisaged the possibility of a change in the

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evaluation of the Kurdish factor. From the cultural point of view the Kurds were still an unwritten sheet of paper. Soviet Russia, so the communist strategists may have argued, thus stood the chance of exercising a paramount influence on the development and the character of a future Kurdish culture, if she only tried.

The raw material for such a Soviet experiment was the small Kurdish minority in Transcaucasia. The exact number of the Kurds in Soviet Russia is as difficult to ascertain as their number in any other country. Officially Russia had only 54,700 Kurds in 1926 and 45,800 in 1939, but unofficial pre-war data recorded as many as 80,000, of whom 40,000 were in Azerbaidzhan, 23,000 in Armenia and the rest in Georgia and Turkmenistan. Only in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan were the Kurds a political problem.

For a long time neither Azerbaidzhani nor Armenian communists seemed to have grasped the importance of the Kurds within the framework of a far-sighted Soviet policy in the Middle East.[1] They either neglected the Kurdish minorities living in their respective republics or even tried to deprive them of their national character.

The Armenian communists disliked the Kurds in view of the role which the latter had played in the Armenian massacres, and thus showed not the slightest interest in their well-being and their mobilization for the Soviet State. Kurds in Armenia were not entrusted with political and social work, no skilled workers were recruited from among them and Kurdish peasants were not even organized into collective farms.[84] In 1936, the Soviet central Government strongly reprimanded the Armenian communists for letting national animosities interfere with their Kurdish policy.

All the mistakes which local Transcaucasian authorities committed in handling the Kurdish question in the inter-war period proved to be unimportant at a moment when Russia was able to use the Kurdish issue on a big scale. Her success in handling the problem was then indisputable. Colonel W. G. Elphinston, who was in charge of Kurdish affairs as a British Middle East Intelligence Officer, said that the effects of propaganda in the Kurdish language originating in the Kurdish community in the U.S.S.R. made themselves felt as far away as Syria, and communist pamphlets in Kurdish penetrated as far as Cairo.[85]

The Kurdish group outside the U.S.S.R. most directly affected by Russian policy and propaganda were the Persian Kurds whose country was occupied by the Red Army between 1941 and 1946. The Soviet occupation authorities did not spread communist ideas among the Kurds; they did not propagate collectivization and nationalization. All they aimed at was to make the Kurds respectful to Soviet Russia, the Russian Army and Stalin. The Kurdish Republic set up with Russian help in 1946 under Quazi Mohammed as Prime Minister was a national

[1] [illegible], pp. 450-457, Kh. Soviet Union — Analysis]